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Principal contractors can achieve better financial performance in civil construction projects by 
increasing the proportion of works delivered by subcontractors.  However, anecdotally the use of 
subcontractors is thought to be make principal contractors less competitive due to compounding 
profit margins. This study found that projects with a higher proportion of subcontracted work 
exhibit better financial results than projects with less work delivered by subcontractors. 
 
This study uses the Christchurch Infrastructure Alliance (known as the Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuild Team, SCIRT) as a case study to observe why principal contracting firms 
engage subcontractors and the effect subcontracting has on the overall performance of a 
construction project. 
 
Five top tier civil contracting firms (known as ‘delivery teams’) participated in the alliance. Each 
team was responsible for the delivery of individual projects. A sample of 334 individual SCIRT 
projects were analysed, and key delivery team staff were surveyed, to investigate the effect 
subcontractor engagement has on performance.  
 
Between the five delivery teams there were clear differences in how much work was delivered via 
subcontracts. The extent of this subcontractor engagement had a significant effect on the relative 
performance of the principal contractor.  A positive correlation between subcontractor 
engagement and overall financial performance is observed, and a negative correlation is observed 
between subcontractor engagement and non-financial performance.  
 
Although the causes of these relationships appear complex, the primary reason appears to be that 
subcontracting fosters increased productivity by cascading financial performance incentives closer 
to the physical construction task. To maximise competitiveness and financial performance, 
principal contractors must embrace the use of subcontractors and develop efficient systems of 
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1. Introduction  
1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis starts with examining the context of the New Zealand infrastructure industry, and the 
local opportunities presented to construction contractors. Following this, a research topic and 
objectives are defined and justified.  
 
1.1. Context and background  
Spending on capital projects and national infrastructure in New Zealand is expected to increase at 
an average rate of 4% annually to $28 billion by 2025 (Oxford Economics, 2014). The New Zealand 
government has identified current relative economic prosperity as a window of opportunity to 
ensure the country’s longer term international competitiveness. Vital to this, is increasing the 
capacity of civil infrastructure networks to provide the foundation of a strong, competitive 
economy.  
 
In 2015, the New Zealand Treasury forecast that $110 billion will be spent on infrastructure during 
the 10 years from 2015-2025 (National Infrastructure Unit, 2015). The National Infrastructure plan 
(2015), identifies among other issues, the need to use more sophisticated methods of 
procurement to ensure the year 2045 target of having a supply of “infrastructure that is resilient, 
coordinated and contributing to a strong economy and high living standards” (National 
Infrastructure Unit, 2015, p. 46).  It is expected that relational procurement strategies that 
aggregate works and increase the magnitude of projects and services will be favoured to reduce 
overhead losses and increase efficiencies of scale (National Infrastructure Unit, 2015).  Contracting 
companies need to prepare themselves to deliver projects in the most efficient manner, in order 
to maintain local competitiveness in the construction market and increase the benefit of 
infrastructure investment for the country.  
 
With an increase in relational style contracts in the industry, there will be an inevitable shift away 
from client-led delivery strategies. This presents an increasing opportunity for lead contractors to 
develop project delivery methods that increase their competitiveness and profitability in the New 
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1.2. Statement of research problem 
Currently, the choice of project delivery method used by top tier contractors in the New Zealand 
civil construction market is not well represented in academic literature. Discussions of the effect 
and utilisation of subcontracts by principal contractors to deliver portions of the physical works 
are largely absent.   
 
Despite this absence, evidence in the industry suggests the prime motivations to utilise such 
subcontracts are well known and understood at the executive level of principal contracting 
companies. However, in the homogeneous environment presented by the SCIRT alliance contract, 
there is evidence of fundamental differences in subcontractor engagement between the principal 
delivery contractors. Furthermore, there are suggestions within the industry that some principal 
contractors believe that engaging subcontractors on a large scale decreases the principal’s 
profitability and competitiveness. This belief has not been subject to the rigours of academic 
scrutiny, and is therefore questionable and requires investigation.   
 
The impending increase in infrastructure spending in the New Zealand construction market, and 
likely change in procurement strategy to favour relational contracts, presents an opportunity for 
contractors to define a subcontracting strategy that will serve to maximise their competitiveness 
and profitability. 
 
On 4 September 2010 a 7.3 magnitude earthquake struck Christchurch City, causing significant 
damage to the city’s infrastructure. Following this, and subsequent earthquakes an alliance 
contract to rebuild the damaged horizontal infrastructure was implemented.  This Alliance has 
become known as SCIRT (The Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team) (Christchurch 
Infrastructure Alliance, 2011). The nature of this alliance contract presents an opportunity to 
review and compare the subcontracting strategies of the alliance participants in a homogeneous 
environment. 
 
1.3. Research Aim and Objectives 
This research aims to identify and evaluate the differing motivations and commercial strategies 
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This work will analyse the situation that has unfolded in SCIRT and provide learnings to the civil 
contracting industry that may increase productivity and efficiency in future large scale disaster 
recovery or capital improvement projects.  
 
SCIRT has committed to developing a repository of information and learnings gained in the rebuild 
process, this project is referred to as the ‘SCIRT Learning Legacy’. The research objectives of this 
thesis align directly with the Learning Legacy purpose of “exploring and implementing smarter and 
more effective ways of providing infrastructure solutions to New Zealand and the international 
community” (SCIRT Learning Legacy, 2014). 
 
The research questions below provide direction to the formulation of the research strategy and 
methods of data collection; 
1. Why do principal contractors subcontract sections of work? 
2. What different strategies do principal contractors employ for subcontracting works? 
3. Does the extent of subcontractor engagement have an effect on financial or non-cost 
performance? 
 
1.4. Scope and Limitations 
This research uses data from the SCIRT alliance. Therefore, its scope is limited to the observations 
of the SCIRT alliance between September 2011 and May 2016. The sample of projects used in the 
study was limited to the availability and completeness of the project data.  
 
The study compares and contrasts the performance and strategy of the five delivery teams within 
SCIRT. It follows then, that the study is limited in some cases to five data points – which for trend 
analysis is a small sample.  
 
There is a reliance on self-reported data in the study, in both the primary and secondary data 
sources. This exposes the findings to the inherent limitations of self-reported data. These 
limitations include, but are not limited to: selective memory; telescoping; attribution and 
exaggeration. However, the use of self-reported data in studies of civil construction is supported 
by Rankin, Fayek, Meade, Haas, & Manseau (2008) in their study measuring performance of the 
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data in construction and assert that its validity and reliability can be improved by combining 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to the research. 
 
1.5. Importance of Research Findings 
The research findings are of particular importance to the civil construction industry. 
Understanding the relationship between subcontractor utilisation and financial performance of 
projects will allow project managers and company executives to make informed strategic 
decisions around the level of subcontracting employed in distinct projects. Optimising 
performance is critical to ensuring the competitiveness of a firm. 
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured in four main parts:  
1. Literature review,  
2. Methodology,  
3. Data presentation and Analysis 
4. Discussion and conclusion.   
 
Firstly, a review of the literature is carried out which explores on the current knowledge for 
subcontracting in civil construction. Following this a study methodology that will allow the 
investigation of the research questions is designed and tested. 
Mixed method research is employed for this study which utilises two sets of data. One set is 
qualitative in nature (collected via interviews), and one set is quantitative (originating from 
recorded observations). Each set of data is first described in detail and defined, then the respective 
results are presented analysed.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. A definition of subcontracting 
Subcontracting is defined by Pagnani (1989) as a legal–economic relationship between two 
agents, in which the characteristic criteria are substitution and subordination.  Substitution 
implies that the subcontractor subsumes the technical and financial risk involved in the operation, 
while subordination denotes that the subcontractor must follow the direction given by the 
principal Shimizu & Cardoso (2002). This type of relationship, where principal and subcontractor 
motivations seem to be at odds, can be strained. It therefore follows that subcontracting creates 
opportunities and issues for all parties involved (Table 1 , taken from (Shimizu & Cardoso, 2002)).  
Table 1: Aspects of subcontracting in the construction industry (Shimizu & Cardoso, 2002). 
Aspects Comments 
Flexibility Subcontracting appears as an answer to market uncertainties 
Quality  
Subcontracting, on the one hand, can improve product quality because it uses specialized 
man power and, on the other hand, can get worse, because it leads to problems of control 
and coordination. 
Costs 
Fixed costs become smaller, while transaction costs increase. Fixed cost are lesser because 
subcontracting eliminates equipment maintenance and underutilised manpower. 
Transaction coast can become bigger, because each new contract negotiation can involve 
some proposals by subcontractors. 
Productivity 
Subcontracting tends to further tie the labourer to the firm subcontractor. Thus, the effects 
of replication, continuity and learning lead to higher productivity by the manpower. Easy 
access to specialised equipment and constant training also lead to higher productivity. 
Controls Controlling the quality of work is difficult with subtracting, because the high amount of independent organisations in the site makes the control of work progress difficult. 
Planning The intensive subcontracting of manpower makes the planning process difficult. Moreover, conflicting interest can intervene negatively with the programming of activities. 
Technology Market instability leads the contracting firms not to establish stable agreements with the subcontractors, thus not allowing technology transfer. 
Training 
The contractors tend to pass the responsibility of training to the subcontractors, but 
generally they are not apt to accomplish it, due to financial features and the lack of time for 
training. 
Safety at work 
The final responsibility for the safety at work falls on the contracting company, as we as the 
implementation of a safety programme, the commitment and supervision of the 
subcontractors. The disinterest of the contract in investing in programmes of safety for 
floating and unknown workers and the lack of familiarity of the workers with the working 
atmosphere aggravates this problem. 
Consumption of 
materials 
Subcontracting can magnify materials waste; subcontractors tend to finish the job as fast as 
possible, without controlling the use of materials. 
 
The logic that specialisation drives increased productivity is simple in its ideals, by dividing work 
tasks into distinct elements, skill requirements are narrowed and costs will therefore decrease. 
This system effectively reduces the subcontractors control over the final product. However, the 
subcontractor retains a considerable degree of control over certain aspects of the labour process, 
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supervision (Marglin, 1974). Therefore, in a system of specialised subcontractors, each remains 
able affect their productivity and quality outputs, despite losing the ability to control the final 
project deliverables.  
 
Today, in the construction industry, project managers from principal contracting companies often 
engage numerous specialty sub-contractors who, collectively, will perform the majority of the 
work in the contract (Sacks & Harel, 2006). In some cases, the entire physical works of a project 
will be completed by subcontractors, with the principal acting in a supervisory/project 
management capacity only.  
 
2.2. Subcontracting in construction 
The extent to which principal contractors operating in the construction industry rely on 
subcontractors and material suppliers for the successful delivery of contracts is well understood 
(Shimizu & Cardoso, 2002; Hinze & Tracey, 1994; Sacks & Harel, 2006; Eom, Kim, & Jang, 2015). 
The prevailing reasoning for this reliance is threefold (Ng & Skitmore, 2014; Nobbs, 1993; Elazouni 
& Metwally, 2000); 
1. Ability -Subcontractors possess specialist trade skills, or have access to specialist machinery 
required; 
2. Flexibility- Subcontractors have flexible capacity to meet the changing labour demands of a 
particular project and,  
3. Cost- specialist subcontractors are often able to perform distinct tasks at a cheaper rate, or by 
using subcontractors project managers attain overall cost certainty around aspects of the 
project.    
 
With these motivations, the use of subcontractors remains a popular alternative to self-
performing construction tasks. Since the mid-1900s principal contracting firms have progressively 
decentralised, as subcontracting became a key element of their businesses (Beardsworth, Keil, 
Bresnen, & Bryman, 1988).  
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned importance of subcontracting in construction, as Eom et al. 
(2015) highlights, analysis of the relationship between principals and subcontractors is largely 
absent from literature. Hinze and Tracy (1994), and Arditi and Chotibhongs (2005) investigated 
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contractual issues. But the conclusions of these studies are limited in how they may be applied 
across differing contractual environments. 
 
2.3. Traditional short-term principal-subcontractor relationships  
In the majority of cases, subcontractors operate in a market of comparable service providers, akin 
to a commodity market where they are one of a pool of suppliers. Therefore, it seems logical that 
in such an environment, subcontractor engagement and selection on part of the principal is a 
simple process. In this environment, principals will go to the market and select the lowest priced 
subcontractor with a conforming service – this is referred to as bid shopping (Hinze & Tracey, 
1994; Arditi & Chotibhongs, 2005). With good contractual arrangements and management, this 
method is an effect means of subcontractor engagement. 
 
This type of contractor selection tends to necessitate a heavy handed approach to subcontractor 
management by principal contractors. After a period of extensive bid shopping, sub-principal 
relationships tend to be adversarial in nature with a greater amount of distrust between the 
parties (Hinze & Tracey, 1994). Principals utilising this approach tend to employ intense contract 
supervision and management to ensure that quality, safety and environmental obligations are met 
by the subcontractor.  While the subcontractor pushes hard to maintain or exceed productivity 
targets in order to increase margins.  Tensions in these environments are high, characterised by 
distrust and a lack of communication between parties.  
 
2.4. Relational contracting  
Globally, the use of procurement strategies which improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
civil construction projects are increasing (Scheepbouwer & Humphries, 2011). The complete 
procurement cycle is seen as one project which involves several key players, including the owner, 
designer, contractor, subcontractor and suppliers (Cheung, Yiu, & Chim, 2006). Relational 
contracts acknowledge this, and recognise the success of a project is dependent on the collective 
ability of the team designing and building it (Asmar, Hanna, & Chang, 2009). 
 
Single-stage procurement, in which the main contractor is appointed only in construction phase, 
shapes the relation between the parties at a stage where equality is not given (Rahmani, Khlfan, 
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maximize their own interests as much as possible. In this situation, a wholehearted cooperation 
is assumed to be difficult, unless a supportive contractual framework is put in place. Thus, in order 
to ensure a “win–win” environment, the selection of contract types is one of the key determinants 
of success (Cheung, Yiu, & Chim, 2006). The contract itself is a projection into the future and 
involves present communication of a commitment to a future event (Kumaraswamy, Rahman, 
Ling, & Phng, 2005). In this context, partnering is believed to represent a possible means of 
addressing the problems of adversarial relationships, mistrust, and inefficient communication in 
the construction industry (Cheung, Yiu, & Chim, 2006). Relational contracting or relationship 
contracting arrangements aim to minimise disputes by recognising and developing common 
interests among contracting parties (Koolwijk, 2006). 
 
Where traditional contracts attempt to enforce and hold contractors to their obligations, 
partnering and relational style contracting incentivise more collaborative solutions, where 
benefits are shared. An alliance agreement where all participants share in the success or failure of 
a project, acts as an effective financial incentive to find quick, amicable solutions to any disputes 
that may arise. 
 
However, it is noted that examples of litigious disputes between parties involved in relational 
contracting are most often groups acting on the periphery of relational contracts such as 
subcontractors and suppliers who are vulnerable as unsecured creditors (Ramachandra & Rotim, 
2015). These parties are not protected from disputes like those acting within the relational 
contract. A litigious dispute is still possible, and probable, with suppliers and subcontractors 
whose goods/services are crucial to the project but are not legally participating within the 
relational contracts. In some cases a traditional contract, established to service the interests of 
the relational contract, may be subject to the same issues of dispute that the original contract 
sought to avoid. In effect, the risk of dispute and litigation cascade down, rather than the issue 
being mitigated outright. 
 
2.5. Relational Changes in subcontractor engagement 
As discussed above, in specialities where the subcontract market for a service is ubiquitous, 
Principal-Subcontractor relationships have in large part been characterised by traditional short 
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within the global business environment have shifted subcontracting toward a more advanced 
principal of partnership (Eom, Kim, & Jang, 2015). 
Eom, Kim, & Jang (2015) state that there is a growing movement toward partnering in Principal-
Subcontractor engagement , perhaps to mitigate the cascaded risk of disputes and the associated 
inefficiencies and negative impacts of such. Eom, Kim, & Jang (2015) identified seven partnering 
elements understood by the industry to be of critical importance in an effective partnering 
relationship; 
1. Subcontracting strategy,  
2. Performance improvement,  
3. Process innovation,  
4. Information sharing,  
5. Cooperation in collaboration,  
6. Standardization of selection,  
7. Feedback of evaluation. 
Although, the results of their research suggest that these elements, while known, are currently 
lacking in execution within the industry. 
2.6. The SCIRT Alliance Contract 
The Stronger Christchurch Rebuild Team (SCIRT) is a complex alliance agreement between eight 
separate participants. It was formed with the purpose of rapidly repairing Christchurch City’s 
horizontal infrastructure after a series of damaging earthquakes. 
2.6.1. Context of the alliance 
On 4 September 2010 a 7.3 magnitude earthquake struck Christchurch City, causing significant 
damage to the city’s infrastructure.  In response to this event, the Christchurch City Council (CCC) 
set up the Infrastructure Rebuild Management Office (IRMO), an internal division to facilitate the 
reinstatement of key council assets (Provost, 2013).   
 
The IRMO identified key areas of damage to CCC assets, and entered into four design-build 
contracts via a competitive tender, to rebuild these areas.  The four successful tenderers were: 
• Fulton Hogan Ltd. 
• Downer New Zealand Ltd. 
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• Fletcher Construction Ltd. and McConnell Dowell Constructors joint-venture 
 
On 22 February 2011 the situation changed, when another earthquake struck Christchurch just 
10km from the central city. The second earthquake caused more extensive damage than the first, 
and CCC soon recognised that the arrangement it had under the IRMO was no longer appropriate 
for the larger scale of the task (Provost, 2013). 
 
In April 2011, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act was passed by the New Zealand 
Government and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) was formed 
(Parlimentary Counsel Office, 2011; Brownlee, 2011). CERA, in collaboration with the New Zealand 
Transport Agency and CCC, reviewed various procurement options for the rebuild of Christchurch 
and decided that an alliance contracting approach would deliver the best outcome. 
By the time an alliance model was proposed, the four contractors working under the IRMO 
arrangement had already begun physical works in their areas (Provost, 2013). Due to this, it was 
agreed that these existing contractors (with the separation of the Fletcher Construction and 
McConnell Dowell joint-venture) would be incorporated as non-owner participants (delivery 
teams) in the new alliance.  
 
The five contractors  formed an unincorporated joint venture to respond to the proposal, and in 
September 2011 the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (The SCIRT Alliance) was 
formed (Christchurch Infrastructure Alliance , 2011). 
2.6.2. The SCIRT Alliance as a homogeneous environment for research 
The SCIRT alliance presents a unique environment where the five delivery teams are operating in 
the same environment - each carrying out very similar work under the same delivery contract. This 
situation affords the opportunity to analyse the differing strategies of the delivery teams in a 
controlled environment.  
2.6.3. Project Definition Within SCIRT 
Within the SCIRT Alliance, delivery teams are allocated distinct projects from the Integrated 
Services Team (IST). Prior to allocation, the IST follows a structured management plan to deliver 
projects from definition and prioritisation through to project completion through a series of stages 
called ‘gates’(Figure 1, page 11). These gates, as defined by the Auditor General (2013) , are 
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Figure 1: Delivery process of SCIRT Projects  
Table 2: Description of SCIRT project delivery gates 
Gate Name Description 
0 Project Definition and prioritisation: 
Project scoping utilises hydraulic wastewater and storm water catchments, 
network interdependencies and proximity considerations to group work 
sections. Repairs are aggregated so where possible an optimum project value of 
$10 million is achieved, however if no interdependencies or efficiencies are to be 
gained individual projects of less that this are created.  
1 Design Allocation: 
 Once scoped, the project is allocated to one of four design teams. The design 
teams are made up of staff seconded from alliance partner and external 
organisations.   
2 Concept Design  In collaboration primarily with the asset owners, concept catchment design solutions are proposed.  
3 Detailed Design 
Constructability guidance is supplied by the delivery teams through early 
contractor involvement. This, along with layers of review and internal and 
external consultation ensure the best detailed design is reached.  
4 Target Cost (TOC) 
SCIRT Estimators, independent of the non-owner participants, use a master 
pricing schedule (which is audited by external parties) to build the target cost of 
a project.  Risk is allowed for in the TOC by way of a risk register, which is 
periodically released as construction progresses. The auditor general 
commissioned a further independent review of the TOC estimation process and 
found that “When relevant variables are considered” (ground conditions, local 
construction market and complexity) “SCIRT projects seem reasonably priced” 
(Provost, 2013, p. 46) 
5 Construction Allocation 
The allocation of a project to a delivery team is a part of the system of measures 
that seek to incentivise competition between the delivery teams in an effort to 
maximise the associated efficiency gains. Construction allocation hinges on the 
calculation of a DPS (Delivery Performance Score) which determines the 
percentage of work to be assigned to a team (Target allocation). The DPS is a 
measure of cost and non-cost performance in current projects. The initial target 
allocation was set to 20% until enough performance data could be gathered to 
start differential allocation. Non-cost performance is measured against the KRA 
framework, this is described in detail in section 2.6.5, page 13. 
Gate 0 - Project 
Definition and 
prioritisation
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6 Construction 
Once a project enters the construction phase it is up to the delivery team to 
deliver the works. During this phase KRAs are monitored through regular audits 
and other means.  
7 Handover 
Once the physical works are complete, delivery teams must collate all relevant 
quality assurance and construction documentation for the project and present it 
to the IST for review. Site inspection with asset owner’s representatives must be 
complete and any significant defects may push the project back into the 
construction phase. 
8 Practical Completion 
 Once the requirements of the handover stage are complete and the there are 
no significant construction defects, the projects enters a 12 month period, 
similar to a defects and liabilities period, in which and issues due to design or 
construction that arise are dealt with by the SCIRT team. During this period, 
normal maintenance and operational issues are dealt with by the asset owner. 
9 Project Completion 12 months after Practical completion is achieved the assets are completely handed back to the owner. 
 
2.6.4. Project Payments in SCIRT 
Delivery teams receive payment for projects under a three-limb commercial framework, with Limb 
1 a reimbursement of actual costs, Limb 2 a profit and corporate overhead margin on the target 
cost, and Limb 3 being a lump sum payment or penalty determined by achievement against 
financial and service performance measures at the completion of the alliance(Table 3, pg.13). 
 
The profit/overhead component of the payment framework is fixed as a proportion of the TOC 
allowance. Therefore, where project scope changes occur Delivery teams are motivated to seek a 
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Table 3: Three limb commercial payment framework for delivery teams within SCIRT 
Limb Description 
1 
The total of the actual costs of the project claimed by the delivery team. It includes costs such as 
labour, plant, materials, transport, site facilities, communication, and advertising. It does not include 
any off-site overheads or profit. All costs are coded and reported to show that they have been 
allocated correctly, and an independent audit provides assurance to the three public entities that 
rates and expenses charged to the project are as defined in the Alliance Agreement. 
2 
Paid as a fixed lump sum to cover profit and corporate overheads. It is a set margin. For projects, this 
is calculated by applying the margin to the Limb 1 costs of the target cost (not the actual costs) 
incurred by the delivery team under Limb 1 for the project. Once the target cost is set, the amount 
paid under Limb 2 does not change unless there is an approved variation to the target cost.  
3 
An incentive payment or cost determined by both financial and service performance. If the actual 
cost of a project is less than the target cost, a ’gain’ is created. If actual costs are greater than the 
target cost, ‘pain’ is created. 
Limb 3 payments are lumped into a final programme completion to be paid by the relevant alliance 
participants at the completion of the SCIRT programme (Christchurch Infrastructure Alliance , 2011). 
Financial performance is measured by comparing the final actual costs (FAC) of a project against its 
final target cost (FTC). Service performance is measured as the Overall Performance Score (OPS) 
which is a maximum score of 100 measured against the Key Result Areas (KRAs) (Table 4).  
• FAC: Final Actual Cost 
• FTC: Final Target Outurn Cost 
• OPS: Overall Performance Score 
To establish an approximate value for the PM11 project an OPS of 75 has been assumed.  
Limb 3 is calculated as follows: (FAC-FTC)× (0.5 – (0.1 × (OPS-50)50))  
 
2.6.5. SCIRT KRA framework and subcontracting bottom line.  
The Alliance agreement (2011) defines the requirements for management of the Key Result Areas 
(KRA). This management plan is used to measure delivery team performance in areas aside from 
cost that have been identified as important to the three non-owner participants. KRAs are 
monitored and contribute toward two key performance scores (Provost, 2013): 
• The Delivery Performance Score (DPS) is generated for each delivery team. The DPS 
collates performance against the KRA’s and performance against TOC to determine the 
amount of future work allocated to each delivery team.  
• An Overall Performance Score (OPS) is generated across the delivery teams to represent 
the overall delivery performance supplied to the Non-owner participants. The OPS 
contributes to the calculation of the limb 3 payment (pain/gain share). 
 
The KRA framework is separated into five areas; safety, value, our team, customer satisfaction and 
environment (Table 4).  Weightings between these areas differ to reflect the impact that each 
have on the development of OPS. With the exception of the Safety area, which has not been given 
a weighting, emphasising the importance of a zero harm culture that is not enticed, but is seen to 
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Table 4: SCIRT Key Performance Indicator framework 
Key Result Indicator Weighting Key Performance Indicator 
Safety 0% Safety Engagement- Awareness 





Our Team 20% 
Alignments & Team Involvement 
Health and Wellbeing 
Ownership of a skilled workforce 
Customer Satisfaction 30% Satisfaction Product 
Satisfaction with communication 
Environment 15% Construction 
Waste Minimisation 
 
There were a number of significant changes to the KRA framework over the course of the SCIRT 
programme, these changes include the introduction of different Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs), and manipulation of weightings on existing KPIs. Changes were made to respond to the 
need to re-calibrate and maintain a consistent focus on continuous improvements in non-cost 
performance areas (Gibb & Cameron, 2014). The reporting bands for all KRIs and component KPIs 
were also subject to regular review to foster continuous improvement. 
2.6.6. Subcontracting in SCIRT 
A minimum level of subcontractor engagement is set in the alliance agreement with the aim of 
fostering a competitive and skilled workforce at the conclusion of the alliance. A minimum of 40% 
of the work completed, by cost, must be subcontracted (Christchurch Infrastructure Alliance , 
2011). A process must be followed to select subcontractors in a competitive and transparent 
manner. The delivery teams are then responsible for ensuring that subcontractors meet the same 
standards of operation and key result area (KRA) reporting that they do (Provost, 2013). 
2.6.7. Changes to design guidelines over the SCIRT programme. 
As SCIRT became responsible for the repair of damaged horizontal infrastructure, it was clear that 
a set of new innovative and efficient design standards would be required. In response to this, the 
Christchurch City Council developed what they called the Infrastructure Recovery Technical 
Standards and Guidelines (IRTSG) (Botha & Scheepbouwer, 2016) (Provost, 2013). These 
guidelines facilitated an immediate response to the most critical repairs. However, over the course 
of the SCIRT programme the IRTSG design guidelines were modified and developed as the needs 
of the network and constraints of working in a posts disaster context were better understood. 
Scheepbouwer & Botha (2016) catalogued these changes, their purpose and evolution. Three 
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(DG43) was adopted in October 2013 and in July 2014 DG43-B was adopted, and in August 2014 
DG43A-1 was also adopted (Trout, 2015) (Figure 2).  
Initially, the IRTSG stipulated rapid repairs, while the subsequent design standards were less likely 
to be class damage as earthquake related. To this end, DG43 deferred all repairs of defects in the 
pipe network with a remaining asset lifespan over 15 years (Heiler, Moore, & Gibson, 2012) as 
cited by (Botha & Scheepbouwer, 2016). This Design Guideline was utilised to design and construct 
approximately 30% of the repair programme (Trout, 2015). DG43 B and A1 further reduced the 
scope of repairs that would be carried out under SCIRT – by effectively reducing the lifespan 
threshold to 5 years (Trout, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 2: Development of design guidelines used during the Christchurch rebuild (Botha & Scheepbouwer, 2016) 
2.7. Literature Review Summary 
This literature review identified gaps in understanding of the motivations surrounding 
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that while the theoretical benefits of engaging subcontractors in general construction is well 
documented, the actual experience and used of subcontractor in the civil construction industry is 
largely undocumented. 
 
Three key reasons for the use of subcontractors have been identified as:  
1. The lack of skill/inability of a principal to self-perform the works.  
2. Flexibility of a subcontractor to meet rapidly changing labour demands.  
3. A subcontractor’s ability to deliver the works for a lesser cost than the principal is able to 
self-perform.  
 
A review of the SCIRT Alliance contract identifies that it presents a unique environment in which 
to observe the subcontracting strategies of multiple principal contractors simultaneously. 
Although, there are constraints which may distort observations and limit the application of any 
findings outside of the Alliance contract environment. These observations may provide a better 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This section provides an overview of the methodology adopted for this research. Discussions 
centre on the method and the strategy used in data acquisition. This chapter also discusses the 
commercial sensitivity of the research and the necessary agreements entered into to afford access 
to data. 
3.1. Research method 
A two-stage quantitative and qualitative approach to this research was adopted: 
• Statistical analysis of financial and productivity data sourced from the SCIRT alliance 
records was used to investigate potential correlations between the proportions and type 
of work subcontracted with financial performance against TOC. 
• Following this data analysis, a series of qualitative questionnaires/interviews was 
conducted with principal Alliance delivery team leaders to investigate potential 
explanations for the observed trends and subcontract strategies.  
3.2. Research Strategy 
Figure 3 presents a flow chart of the research activities employed to achieve the research 
objectives. This includes a broad review of the literature, collection and analysis of data, and 
extraction of conclusions. 
 
Figure 3: Flow chart of research activities. 
Establishment of 
research objective
Conduct review of 
literature and collection 
of quantitative data
Collect and collate 
qualitative data from 
SCIRT project records
Conduct graphical and 
statistical analysis to 
identify trends and 
significance
Design interview 
template to investigate 
displayed trends with 
delivery team business 
leaders
Pre-test and administer 
survey to Delivery team 
leaders
Collate and aggregate 
results of survey to and 
draw conclusions of 
research
Thesis write up and 
submission –
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3.3. Data collection methodology 
Potential data sources for this research were identified by consultation and discussion with SCIRT 
staff and executive leaders. As a result, data was pursued from two distinct sources: 
1. SCIRT Project records for productivity, financial and labour data. 
2. The aggregated opinions and views of key decision makers amongst the delivery teams 
 
The SCIRT project records and data procured for this research was not originally collected with the 
original intention of being part of this study. As such this data is categorised as being sourced from 
a secondary data source. The aggregated opinions were collected for the purposes of this study 
and as such are considered a primary source of qualitative data. 
The collection mechanism, and survey design, required to gather the opinions and views of key 
decision makers amongst the delivery teams is dependent on the results and analysis of 
quantitative SCIRT project data. Therefore, it was decided to proceed with a sequential two stage 
process. Quantitative data collection was the first stage. The acquisition and analysis of project 
records sought to record observations and identify trends in subcontracting throughout the SCIRT 
programme. These observations were then able to be utilised to formulate an appropriate method 
with which to interrogate delivery team leaders and gather the necessary qualitative data.  
3.3.1. Qualitative data collection 
A questionnaire survey was designed to record responses from delivery team personnel who had 
influence over the management of, or decision to use (or not to use), subcontractors within SCIRT. 
The questionnaire was designed to measure latent variables that may provide meaning to the 
observations made in the analysis of the secondary data source.  
The relevance and design of the interview questionnaire was tested via a pre-test interviews with 
two delivery team executives - these executives were chosen for their interest in the subject and 
willingness to assist in the research process. The feedback from these pre-tests confirmed the 
validity of the interview questionnaire and afforded some changes to be made to the final 
questionnaire.  
Using a five-point Likert scale from 1 to 5, where 1 symbolizes ‘strongly agree’ and 5 represents 
‘strongly disagree’ respondents were asked to rank statements made on: motivating factors in 
deciding to utilise subcontractors; the effects of using subcontractors; and the importance of 
other factors on project performance measures (Appendix 3). This approach to scaling responses 
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1) Suitability of Likert-type scales to the measurement of latent variables, and ease of data 
analysis.  
2) The ongoing use of Likert scales in prior studies of engineering management (Chang-
Richards, Wilkinson, Seville, & Potangaroa, 2011). The questionnaire also requested for 
respondents to comment on any other potential factors and rate them accordingly.  
3.3.2. Quantitative data sources  
Project data was procured though the internal SCIRT data archives. A large portion of the data was 
stored in bespoke cloud based data repository called ‘HiVis’. This facility was created for SCIRT 
staff, delivery team managers, and project managers to gain an overview of how teams and 
projects performed. Configured for each user, the system displays project dashboards and data in 
charts and tables. The system aggregates the data reported from numerous sources across the 
program, which are updated monthly. The databases behind this facility were extracted and used 
as the basis of the quantitative data source. 
 
The data source utilised was split into two levels of detail: project data, and monthly data. Project 
level data was available for records of financial performance and subcontractor engagement. 
However, non-cost performance measures were not recorded at the project level, and were only 
available as monthly aggregations for each delivery team. This difference will necessarily effect 
the analysis technique in interrogating each level of data.  
 
3.4. Commercial Sensitivity 
In order to afford industry backing, this research has been carried out in complete commercial 
sensitivity and anonymity. Data for this analysis was made available by the SCIRT Integrated 
Services Team (IST) with the approval of all the delivery team leads within SCIRT. A joint non-
disclosure agreement was entered into to protect any commercially sensitive information from 
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4. QUANTITATIVE DATA DESCRIPTION  
The details of 731 individual projects were made available for the study in May 2016.  Of the initial 
731 projects, 457 (63%) had TOC and subcontract usage data available (Table 5).  The balance of 
projects, without required data, fall into one of the following three categories (R. Wesley, personal 
communication, May 23, 2016): 
Table 5: The number of SCIRT projects by Project status at May 2016 
Project Status Number of Projects Projects with required data 
Concept Design 2 0 
Detailed Design 8 0 
TOC 9 0 
Construction Allocation 2 0 
Construction 130 123 
Handover 33 31 
Practical Completion 210 207 
Project Completion 337 96 
Total 731 457 
 
• The TOC value had not yet been completed, i.e. the project has not passed through the TOC 
phase 
• A project had negligible construction costs – few or no physical works  
• A project originated in the IRMO prior to the establishment of SCIRT - these projects did not 
have TOC values estimated.  
 
334 of the projects with available data are deemed by the IST to have either Handover, Practical 
Completion or Project Completion status (Table 5, Description of project status see 2.6.3- Page 
10). These 334 projects are the sample of data used in this analysis, referred to as the ‘sample 
projects’.  
4.1. Introduction of observed continuous variables 
In this section, the three key scale variables that were analysed are defined and discussed.  
4.1.1. TOC Performance 
As discussed (section 2.6.3, page 10) TOC (Target Outturn Cost) is the estimated total expenditure 
required to deliver the project. Internal SCIRT Estimators who act independently of the non-owner 
Alliance participants use a master pricing schedule and productivity schedule to build the target 
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performance is the projects TAC as a proportion of its TOC value.  Descriptive statistics for TOC 
performance data are available in Table 6 (page 23), a frequency distribution shows the data 
displays symmetric central tendency that supports an assumption of normality (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Frequency Distribution of sample projects TOC Performance 
4.1.2. Subcontracted Proportion 
The proportion of work subcontracted in a project is measured in two distinct ways.  
1. At a project level, comparing the total expenditure on subcontractors with project Total 
Actual Costs. 
2. At a month level by comparing the total subcontracted man hours with the total actual 
man-hours. 
Subcontracted proportion data displays non-normal characteristics when observed as a frequency 
distribution (Figure 5). As described in section 2.6.6 (page 14) subcontracted performance is 
bound between a fixed upper where 100% of the project was performed by subcontractors, and 
a lower constraint that a minimum of 40% of total expenditure must be completed through 
subcontracts. With these constrains in mind, the observed skewedness of the data is expected.  
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Figure 5: Frequency Distribution of sample projects subcontracted proportion 
4.1.3. Non-Cost performance  
As previously discussed in (section 2.6.5, Page 13) changes were made to the KRA framework 
during the SCIRT programme, both in how KPI were recorded and scaled to maintain a consistent 
focus on continuous improvements in non-cost performance areas (Gibb & Cameron, 2014). These 
changes make drawing comparisons between delivery team’s performances on individual KRA’s 
more complicated. As the DPS is inconsistent between months, the development of a consistent 
measure of non-cost performance is necessary to facilitate analysis over time.  
 
The relative Non-Cost Performance Index (RNCPI) is a measure of non-cost performance relative 
to the monthly mean performance of all delivery teams. This index is calculated as the difference 
between the mean recorded monthly DPS of all delivery teams (𝑋𝑋�) and a delivery team’s recorded 
monthly DPS (𝑋𝑋) (Equation 1). 
Equation 1: Relative Non-Cost Performance Index 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑋𝑋� 
Monthly records of DPS, total subcontracted man-hours, and total internal man-hours were made 
available for 34 consecutive months from July 2013 to April 2016 for this study.  
The RNCPI frequency distribution shows the data displays a symmetric central tendency that 
supports an assumption of normality (Figure 6).  Descriptive statistics for RNCPI data are available 
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Figure 6: Frequency Distribution of sample projects Relative Non-Cost Performance Index (RNCPI) 
4.1.4. Descriptive statistics and assumption of normality 
The assumption of normality in the scale variable datasets is necessary for simple and efficient 
parametric data analysis. An assumption of normality allows a confidence interval based 
assessment of difference between categorical means.  
The TOC performance and RNCPI data display consistency with the characteristics of the normal 
distribution. However, for the reasons discussed in 4.1.3 (page 22) subcontracted proportion does 
not display these same normal characteristics. For the purposes of this study, normality is 
assumed across all there scale variables and the potential effects of this considered negligible.  
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of observed continuous variables 
Statistic TOC Performance Subcontracted Proportion  RNCPI 
Mean 0.97 0.56 0.00 
Standard Error 0.02 0.02 0.31 
Median 0.95 0.60 0.36 
Standard Deviation 0.28 0.28 4.02 
Sample Variance 0.08 0.08 16.17 
Range 2.03 1.08 19.05 
Minimum 0.08 0.00 -10.23 
Maximum 2.11 1.08 8.82 
Count 334 334 170 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.03 0.03 0.61 
 
4.2. Introduction and description of categorical interaction variables  
The extent of the data available for the sample projects afford the ability to investigate the 
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measures – such as performance against TOC. However it also enables the ability to control these 
investigations for interactions with key categorical variables that may influence the result. Table 
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Table 7: Categorical variable summary, description and levels. 
Categorical Variable Description Levels 
Delivery team 
Denotes which of the five contractor 
alliance participants completed the  
















Project Scope categories 
Individual project scope categorised by 
the nature of the construction work 
involved. 
BR - Bridge 
MIX – Mixed type 
PS - Pump station 
RD – Road 
RW - Retaining Wall 
SW - Storm Water 
WS - Water Supply 
WW - Waste Water 
Location 
The location of individual sample 
projects within Christchurch. Based 
primarily on Christchurch City Council 
representative ward boundaries at the 
2013 council elections, with the 









Project start period  
Individual project construction start 
month, grouped into thirds. Months 9-
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5. QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
In this section, analysis of the data procured from the SCIRT ‘Hi-Viz’ database (the secondary data 
source) is presented.  
Firstly the relationship of subcontracted proportion, and TOC performance to the six categorical 
variables (as discussed in section 4.2, Page 23) is presented, concluding with the presentation of 
a regression model to predict TOC Performance. The categorical variable analysis is presented in 
the following order:  
1. Delivery team 
2. Value (Value Quartile and Value band) 
3. Project Scope  
4. Projects Location  
5. Project Start Period 
Secondly the relationship between monthly non-cost performance and the proportion of work 
subcontracted is examined and presented. 
5.1. Delivery Team; Subcontracting and Performance against TOC 
The delivery team category provides the ability to distinguish between each of the five delivery 
teams. The delivery teams have been assigned a random letter A-E to provide anonymity as per 
the Non-disclosure Agreement entered into to facilitate this study (Appendix 2).  Delivery teams 
are resourced by the following five companies: 
• City Care Ltd 
• Downer New Zealand Limited 
• Fletcher Construction Limited 
• Fulton Hogan Limited 
• McConnell Dowell Constructors  
The sample projects are not evenly distributed between the delivery teams with the proportion 
delivered by an individual team ranging between 12-26% of the total sample value (Table 8). 
Table 8: Delivery Team Categories, total value and number of projects 
Delivery Team Total Value of Projects Number of Projects 
A $139,179,871.82 59 
B $211,598,709.95 87 
C $188,940,758.39 58 
D $184,154,863.33 78 
E $100,449,044.36 52 
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5.1.1. Difference in subcontracted proportion between delivery teams 
The mean proportions of project value subcontracted by delivery teams varies by more than 40%.  
Contractor C exhibits the highest mean proportion of 75%, while contractor E the lowest at 35% 
(Table 9).  This difference and others, are significant at a significance level of 0.05, as can be 
observed in Figure 7. Delivery teams B&D did not display a significant level of difference between 
subcontracted proportions at 0.05 significance level, and neither did delivery teams C&A. This 
shows there are three significantly different levels of subcontractor engagement observed 
between the five delivery teams.  
Table 9: Estimated mean proportion of project value subcontracted by delivery team. 
Delivery Team Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
A .688 .032 .625 .752 
B .516 .027 .463 .569 
C .753 .033 .688 .817 
D .529 .028 .473 .584 
E .348 .035 .280 .416 
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5.1.2. Difference in mean financial performance against TOC between delivery teams 
The observed mean project expenditure of the five Delivery Teams ranges between 91% of TOC 
(delivery team B) and 108% of TOC (delivery team E). The difference between these two delivery 
teams (B&E) is significant at 0.05. However, this is the only significant (at α=0.05) difference in 
mean expenditure proportion between delivery teams observed. 
 
Table 10: Mean project performance against TOC by delivery team. 
Delivery Team Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
A 1.002 .036 .932 1.073 
B .917 .029 .859 .975 
C .954 .036 .883 1.025 
D .955 .031 .894 1.016 








4. Results; Data Presentation, analysis and discussion  
5.2. Project Value; Subcontracting and Performance against TOC. 
The average value of a sample project is $2.46M, however this is heavily skewed with a median 
project value of $0.94M (Table 11). 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of sample project by total value 
Mean $2,468,033.68 
Standard Error $210,922.53 
Standard Deviation $3,854,749.83 
Minimum $1,084.89 
Quartile 2 $231,219.85 
Median $936,469.54 






The majority of the sample projects are of relatively small value. 51% of the sample comprises of 
projects with a value less than $1million, a further 17% has a value under 2 million. The frequency 
distribution of the sample projects is shown in Figure 9.  
  
 
Figure 9: Frequency Distribution of sample projects by value 
Table 12 shows the value distribution between quartiles of project data ranked by project value. 
Whilst the number of distinct projects in each quartile remains relatively constant, more than 
three quarters of the sample’s total value is found in the fourth quartile alone. Conversely, the 
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categorisation is developed to maintain a consistent category value. Four value bands each with 
a quarter of the total sample value. Combined, these categorisations permit the investigation of 
effects of project value on the dependant variables. 
Table 12: Value distribution between quartiles and value bands of sample projects 
 Category Number of Projects Combined Value Proportion of total Value 
Value 
Quartile 
1 84 $9,633,804 1% 
2 83 $42,644,152 5% 
3 83 $134,576,556 16% 
4 84 $637,468,735 77% 
Value Band 
>12.5M 12 $203,732,248 25% 
>7.4M<12.5M 22 $211,646,544 26% 
>2.94<7.4M 46 $210,735,925 26% 
<2.94M 254 $198,208,531 24% 
 
5.2.1. Project value effects on subcontracted proportion  
There is a significant difference between the estimated mean proportion of project value 
subcontracted between the first and fourth project value quartiles. The first quartile has a mean 
proportion of 49%, this increases to a mean value of 64% in the fourth quartile (Table 12).  There 
is no significant difference between any other quartiles. This is depicted graphically in Figure 10, 
which shows the differences between project value quartiles with error bars displayed at 95% 
confidence intervals 
Table 13: Estimated mean proportion of project value subcontracted by value quartile and Value band. 
 
Category Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Value Quartile 
Q1 .499 .030 .439 .558 
Q2 .543 .030 .483 .602 
Q3 .574 .030 .514 .633 
Q4 .642 .030 .583 .702 
Value Band 
<2.94M 0.53 0.037 0.457 0.603 
>2.94M<7.4M 0.659 0.112 0.438 0.881 
>7.4M<12.5M 0.701 0.12 0.464 0.938 
>12.5M 0.683 0.132 0.424 0.943 
 
.  
The mean proportion of project work subcontracted between the four value bands ranges 
between 53% and 70% (Table 13). There is no evidence to suggest a significant difference between 
the means (Figure 11). Though there is a marginal increase of 15.3% in the mean rate between 
the lowest value band and highest- the standard error of the means is such that this difference in 
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Figure 11: Estimated mean proportion of project value subcontracted by value band, with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
5.2.2. Project value effects on mean project TOC  performance  
Table 14: Estimated mean proportion of project performance against TOC by value quartile and Value band. 
 
Category Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Value Quartile 
Q1 .823 .029 .766 .880 
Q2 1.011 .029 .954 1.068 
Q3 1.031 .029 .974 1.088 
Q4 1.028 .029 .971 1.085 
Value Band 
<2.94M .957 .017 .923 .992 
>2.94M<7.4M 1.015 .041 .934 1.095 
>7.4M<12.5M 1.012 .059 .896 1.129 
>12.5M 1.073 .080 .915 1.231 
 
 
The mean project performance against TOC is significantly better in the first quartile than the 
second, Third and Fourth quartiles (Table 14). This trend continues when using the value band 
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to the top Value band (Over 12.5M), however there is no significant difference with the two 
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5.3. Project scope; Subcontracting and Performance against TOC 
The scope of work SCIRT was tasked with completing can be broadly categorised as repairs to 
horizontal infrastructure. However, individual project scope can be categorised in more detail by 
the type of work involved. The sample project set is categorised into eight different definitions 
depending on the nature of work involved (Table 15). 21% of the sample projects are categorised 
as ‘mixed type’, these are projects that included many different categories of work. For example; 
a project may have included road construction and waste water repairs. With 26% of the sample, 
the most common project type was waste water projects.  
Table 15: Number of projects by scope category in sample 
Project Scope 
category 
Delivery Team Overall 
A B C D E Total Proportion 
BR - Bridge 5 1 5 13 1 25 7% 
MIX – Mixed type 17 17 11 15 11 71 21% 
PS - Pump station 3 3 3 3 4 16 5% 
RD – Road  4 11 3 13 9 40 12% 
RW - Retaining Wall 7 11 8 10 6 42 13% 
SW - Storm Water 2 2 1 - 2 7 2% 
WS - Water Supply 5 26 4 4 6 45 13% 
WW - Waste Water 16 16 23 20 13 88 26% 
Total 59 87 58 78 52 334 100% 
5.3.1. Project scope effects on subcontracted proportion  
Table 16: Estimated mean proportion of project value subcontracted by project scope. 
Type Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BR .560 .053 .455 .665 
MIX .608 .032 .545 .671 
PS .581 .067 .449 .712 
RD .381 .042 .299 .463 
RW .449 .041 .369 .529 
SW .590 .101 .391 .788 
WS .582 .040 .504 .661 
WW .659 .028 .603 .715 
 
The mean proportion of project work subcontracted varied from 38% for roading projects, to 65% 
for waste water projects (Table 16). There were significant differences in the mean level of 
subcontracting between various groups (Figure 14). Roading projects displayed a significantly 
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Figure 14: Estimated mean proportion of project value subcontracted by project scope category, with 95% confidence 
intervals. 
5.3.2. Project Scope effects on mean project performance against TOC  
Table 17: Estimated mean proportion of mean project performance against TOC by project scope. 
Type Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BR .946 .054 .840 1.052 
MIX 1.028 .032 .964 1.092 
PS 1.133 .067 1.000 1.265 
RD .907 .042 .824 .990 
RW .885 .041 .804 .966 
SW 1.144 .102 .944 1.344 
WS .862 .040 .783 .941 
WW 1.025 .029 .969 1.082 
 
The mean project performance against TOC varied from 114% for Storm Water projects, to 86% 
for water supply projects (Table 17). There were significant differences observed in the mean level 
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Figure 15: Estimated mean project performance against TOC by project scope, with 95% confidence intervals. 
5.4. Location; Subcontracting and Performance against TOC 
The entire SCIRT project is geographically confined to the city of Christchurch by the local government 
boundary. However, individual projects can be further categorised geographically by the 
representative council ward that they are within. Seven representative wards were initially put in 
place for the 2013 Christchurch City Council elections – and with the added distinction if a Central City 
ward these boundaries remained a useful way to categorise the projects within SCIRT (Table 18). These 
wards can be further broken down into drainage catchments, however for the purposes of this study 
the eight wards will suffice. The Central City ward is the rectangular area contained within ‘The four 
Avenues’ (Moorehouse Ave, Bealey Ave, Fitzgerald Ave, and Deans Ave). Detailed maps of the ward 
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Table 18: Number and total value of project by council ward locations. 
Ward Total Value of Projects Number of Projects 
Banks Peninsula $20,372,535.16 22 
Burwood-Pegasus $254,497,530.44 82 
Central City $96,684,458.75 32 
Fendalton-Waimairi $41,483,376.12 16 
Hagley-Ferrymead $224,929,900.96 109 
Riccarton-Wigram $16,882,342.87 11 
Shirley-Papanui $64,185,401.51 28 
Spreydon-Heathcote $105,287,702.04 34 
Grand Total $824,323,247.85 334 
 
5.4.1. Project Location effects on subcontracted proportion 
Table 19: Estimated mean proportion of project value subcontracted by project location. 
Location Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Banks Peninsula .305 .057 .192 .418 
Burwood-Pegasus .593 .030 .534 .651 
Central City .682 .048 .589 .775 
Fendalton-Waimairi .449 .067 .317 .581 
Hagley-Ferrymead .569 .026 .519 .620 
Riccarton-Wigram .431 .081 .272 .591 
Shirley-Papanui .653 .051 .553 .753 
Spreydon-Heathcote .561 .046 .470 .652 
 
The mean project proportion subcontracted ranged from 30.5% in Banks Peninsular to 68% in the 
Central City (Table 19). The Banks Peninsular ward showed a significantly lower mean project 
proportion subcontracted than five of the other wards. The remaining wards displayed no 
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Figure 16: Estimated mean proportion of project value subcontracted by project location, with 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
5.4.2. Project Location effects on mean project performance against TOC 
Table 20: Estimated mean project performance against TOC by project location. 
Location Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Banks Peninsula .863 .058 .748 .978 
Burwood-Pegasus .952 .030 .893 1.012 
Central City .967 .048 .872 1.062 
Fendalton-Waimairi 1.036 .069 .901 1.171 
Hagley-Ferrymead .949 .026 .897 1.001 
Riccarton-Wigram 1.187 .083 1.024 1.350 
Shirley-Papanui .981 .052 .879 1.083 
Spreydon-Heathcote 1.072 .047 .979 1.164 
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Figure 17: Estimated mean project performance against TOC by project location with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
5.5. Project start Period; Subcontracting and performance against TOC 
Due to the design of the SCIRT alliance agreement and financial incentivisation of collaboration 
between non-owner participants as a result of limb 3 payment provisions, it is expected that 
measures of delivery performance should increase over the course of the contract lifetime 
(Christchurch Infrastructure Alliance , 2011) (Provost, 2013).  
 
This expectation is observed in the sample data. Over the course of the SCIRT programme the 
average sample project financial performance improved (Figure 18). At the beginning of the SCIRT 
programme average final costs were in excess of 110% of the total TOC allowance, this overrun is 
seen to drop away overtime, in the 59th month of the programme the average project spend was 
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Figure 18: Project performance over time, as a rolling 12 Month average of project TOC performances.  
 
To isolate this potential effect for analysis, the projects have been categorised in thirds by their 
start date (Table 21). This categorisation finds that the combined value of the projects within each 
programme period is not equal, the value and number of projects increased as the programme 
progressed. 
Table 21: Project start date categories 
Project Start 
Date  Number of Projects Combined Value Proportion of total Value 
Sep11 – Feb13 83 $36,212,106.47 4% 
Feb13 - Jul14 96 $275,120,339.65 33% 
Jul14 - Nov15 155 $512,990,801.73 62% 
 
Splitting the SCIRT programme into periods allows a comparison of the means for each 
programme third and significance testing of the data (Figure 19). The first third of the programme 
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Figure 19: Average SCIRT project performance against TOC by Programme segment thirds, with 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Across these same thirds the average subcontracting rate remained steady, with no significant 
changes in the average rate between the thirds. Between 55 and 60% of the total spend was on 
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Figure 20: Mean proportion of project spend on subcontractors for all delivery teams by programme segment thirds, 
with 95% Confidence Interval. 
However, the rate of subcontracting was found to be significantly different between delivery 
teams. Initially, there was a large difference in the amount of work subcontracted between 
delivery teams, in the early months on SCIRT this difference is particularly obvious - with one 
delivery team subcontracting more than 90% of the work and another letting only 20% (Figure 
21). 
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
Proportion of total spent on
subcontractors 56% 55% 60% 60%
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Figure 21: Rolling 12 month average of subcontracted proportion by DT 
The significant differences between delivery teams becomes clear when viewed by programme 
segment with confidence intervals (Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22: Mean proportion of project spend on subcontractors by Programme segment thirds with delivery team 
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5.6. Subcontracting and Financial performance 
The Sample data indicates that there are differences in financial performance of delivery teams, 
with the range of expenditure stretching 95% - 117% of the total allocated TOC allowance (Table 
22). 
Table 22: Delivery team financial performance and proportionate use of subcontractors. 
Delivery 
team Spend Revised TOC 
Subcontractor 
Spend 
% of TOC 
Spent 
% of Spend on 
Subcontractors 
A $139,074,231 $143,758,073 $100,289,348 97% 72% 
B $211,507,589 $210,973,975 $128,733,773 100% 61% 
C $188,940,758 $198,913,015 $148,964,011 95% 79% 
D $183,692,217 $187,846,365 $95,806,616 98% 52% 
E $100,371,970 $85,678,442 $46,699,625 117% 47% 
Total $823,586,766 $827,169,871 $520,493,373 100% 63% 
 
Performance is correlated with the extent to which subcontractors are utilised by the Delivery 
Team.  Figure 23 shows this correlation as the subcontracted portion of work decreases, 
proportion of TOC spend decreases. Contractors A&C perform the best, with the highest 
expenditure on subcontracts and contractor E has the worst financial performance and lowest 
expenditure on subcontracts. The exception to this trend are contractors D & B, where contractor 
B subcontracted 9% more work than contractor D, and performed 2% worse against TOC.  
A linear regression using total expenditure on subcontractors to predict overall sample 
performance against TOC shows an R Square value of 0.545, the linear regression is statistically 
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5.7. Subcontracting and KRA performance 
In this section non-cost performance is compared across delivery teams, and project start period. 
As discussed in section 3.3.2 (page 19) non cost performance data is limited to analysis of 
aggregated data reported monthly by delivery team. That is, summary data for all projects in the 
delivery phase for the reporting month. Project level non-cost performance data is not available 
for analysis. 
5.7.1. A comparison of Non-cost performance between delivery teams 
A comparison of mean RNCPI shows that there are significant differences in the relative non-cost 
performance between delivery teams (Figure 24). Delivery teams B&C performed significantly 
better than the other delivery teams.  
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The average performance score for delivery teams B&C were respectively 3.6 and 2.5 percentage 
points higher than the average monthly mean non-cost delivery performance score for all teams 
(Table 23). The RCNPI for delivery team D was 0.4, while delivery teams A and E displayed the 
worst non-cost performance with a mean RNCPI of -2.4 and -2.3 respectively. 
Table 23: Comparison of mean Relative Non-cost Performance Index between delivery teams for sample projects. 
Delivery Team Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
A -2.442 .515 -3.458 -1.425 
B 3.620 .515 2.604 4.637 
C 2.538 .515 1.521 3.554 
D -.399 .515 -1.416 .617 
E -3.317 .515 -4.333 -2.301 
5.7.2. A comparison of Non-cost performance across programme period 
A comparison of RNCPI across programme thirds shows that there were significant differences in 
non-cost performance of delivery teams as the SCIRT programme went on (Figure 25). For this 
analysis the sample data was spilt in to 11 month periods; 
1) July 2013-May 2014, 
2) June 2014- April 2015, 
3) May 2015-April 2016. 
 
Delivery team A showed consecutive significant improvements in relative non cost performance, 
while delivery teams D and E showed significant declines in RNCPI between periods 1-2 and 2-3 
respectively.  Delivery teams D&C did not show significant differences in Non-cost performance 
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Figure 25: The mean Relative Non Cost Performance Index for each delivery team over programme period. 
 
5.7.3. Non-cost performance and use of subcontractors 
Differences in non-cost performance is also correlated with the extent to which subcontractors 
are utilised by a Delivery Team.  As the proportion of total man-hours worked by subcontractors 
increased, relative non cost performance decreases.  
A linear regression using the proportion of man-hours worked by subcontractors and delivery 
team to predict mean non cost performance (RNCPI) shows as the proportion of subcontracted 
hours worked increases, non-cost performance decreases. The regression has an R Square value 
of 0.600, a regression table is available in Appendix 1 as Table 29. Both the subcontracted 
proportion and the interaction between this proportion and individual delivery team have p-
values of less than 0.05 and are therefore statistically significant at α=0.05. This suggests that non-
cost performance decreases in as subcontractor use increases, by differing amounts depending 
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Linear regressions of the proportion of total man-hours worked by subcontractors on RNCPI for 
delivery teams A&C explain the most variation in the proportion of hours subcontracted, with R2 
values of 0.49 & 0.52 (Figure 26). While the same regression for Delivery teams B & C explained 
less than 5% of the variation in the data.  
 
Figure 26: Monthly proportion of total man-hours worked by subcontractors’ vs relative Non Cost Performance Index 
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6. QUALITATIVE DATA DESCRIPTION  
A questionnaire was administered to 28 delivery team personnel who had influence over the 
management of, or decision to use (or not to use), subcontractors within SCIRT. Respondents from 
all delivery teams were sought to allow a full cross section of views from the delivery teams to be 
communicated (Table 24).  
Table 24: Questionnaire respondents by delivery team. 
Delivery team Respondents Percentage  
A 5 18% 
B 6 21% 
C 6 21% 
D 6 21% 
E 5 18% 
Total 28  
 
Respondents were sought from five organisational roles within the delivery teams (Table 25). The 
majority of respondents (57%) were in procurement management positions that had influence 
over the decision to engage (or not to engage) subcontractors, these being Senior Managers, 
Project Managers and Project Engineers.  While the remaining 43%, were primarily involved in the 
practical management of subcontracted and internally delivered construction activities in the 
roles of Site Engineers and Superintendents. 
Table 25: Questionnaire respondents by organisational role within delivery team. 
Level of influence Role Respondents Percentage  
Procurement 
Management  
Project Engineer 2 7% 
Project Manager 8 29% 
Senior Manager 6 21% 
Construction 
Management  
Site Engineer 10 36% 
Superintendent 2 7% 
Total  28 100% 
 
Respondents had worked within the SCIRT contract environment for between 1 and 5 years 
(Figure 27). The average tenure of respondents was just over 2 years, with the most common 
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7. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
In this section, analysis of the data collected through interview questionnaires (the qualitative 
data source) is presented and analysed. The results and analysis in this section is organised into 
the following subsections: 
1. The factors influencing the motivation to engage subcontractors on SCIRT projects 
2. The perceived effects of utilising subcontractors on SCIRT projects. 
3. Other general factors affecting the performance of a SCIRT project.  
7.1. Motivation to use subcontractors  
Subjects were asked to respond on a five point Likert scale to eleven Likert items, to assess their 
opinions on the motivating factors to engage a subcontractor over using internal resources.  A 
summary of the results from this section of questions are presented in Table 26 (Page 56) and are 
represented visually in Figure 28 (Page 57). 
Figure 28 displays the results items ranked by the proportion of total respondents who were in 
agreement with the statement posed. The highest ranked items consider the provision of required 
specialist resources, and the perceived ability to reduce financial risk to the principal contactor. 
For the most part, respondents did not consider that subcontractors rate of work, or management 
requirements, to be as important as resourcing considerations. 82% of respondents were either 
neutral or disagreed that internal delivery was more costly than subcontracting. 
Respondents were also asked to supply general comments on the topic of motivations to engage 
subcontractors. One senior manager, echoing the results of the Likert scale, expressed their view 
that a key motivating factor was demand for specialist skills and plant; “During the SCIRT project 
we were stretched for resources” “Subcontractors were used to meet the gaps in specialist skills 
and plant requirements in areas where the delivery teams did not keep a traditional large skill 
base.” 
A project manager asserted that using subcontractors “gave us the flexibility to deliver large 
volumes of work, without large scale recruitment of skilled labour”. This comment aligned with 
the third ranked Likert item which 82% of respondents agreed with; ‘(using subcontractors) 
provides flexibility to meet changing labour demands’.  
7.2. Effects of using subcontractors 
To assess the effects of engaging subcontractors over using internal resources subjects were asked 
to respond on a five point Likert scale to 10 Likert statements presented in a random order. In five 
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1. Quality performance 
2. Cost Certainty 
3. Management Cost 
4. Overall Non-Cost Performance 
5. Health, Safety and Environmental Performance 
A summary of the results from this section of questions are presented in Table 27 (Page 56) and 
are represented visually in Figure 28 (Page 57). 
7.2.1. Quality Performance  
Participants were asked to respond to two opposing statements regarding the quality of work 
delivered by subcontractors compared to internally delivered work.  In both cases a neutral 
response was the most common, with little difference in perceived effect between the opposing 
statements across all delivery teams. 
Differences in the perceived effect on quality were observed in the comments of those respondent 
who did not respond neutrally. This divergence in opinion is summarised particularly well by two 
respondent’s comments.  A Manager from delivery team D stated: “some of our subcontractors 
have staff who were very new to the industry, this leads to potential quality issues”. While a Site 
Engineer from delivery team C suggested the opposite. “When managing a subcontractor you are 
able to focus on quality and safety issues rather than productivity as well”. 
7.2.2. Cost Certainty 
Respondents were asked to respond to two opposing statements regarding the certainty of final 
costs of work delivered by subcontractors compared to internally delivered work.  The results 
clearly show a perceived increase in cost certainty when using subcontractors. 64% of respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed that cost certainty increases when tasks are subcontracted, and 
conversely 61% disagreed that cost certainty would decrease.   
7.2.3. Management Cost 
Participants were asked to respond to two opposing statements regarding the effect on cost of 
management when utilising subcontractors compared to internally delivered work.  The results 
clearly show a perceived decrease in management cost when using subcontractors. Management 
cost decrease was the highest ranked effect of engaging a subcontractor. 79% of respondents 
recorded either agree or strongly agree with the statement ‘When using subcontractors 
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One participant claimed that “Using subcontractors decreases internal management costs” and 
then qualified that statement by claiming that the overall cost of the task would be higher due to 
subcontractor P&G. 
7.2.4. Overall non-cost Performance 
Participants were asked to respond to two opposing statements regarding the Overall non-cost 
Performance of work delivered by subcontractors compared to internally delivered work.  In both 
cases a neutral response was the most common. However, an indication towards non-cost 
performance increasing when utilising subcontractors was observed. 
7.2.5. Health, Safety and Environmental Performance 
Participants were asked to respond to two opposing statements regarding the risk of health safety 
or environmental incidents during work delivered by subcontractors compared to internally 
delivered work. The results clearly show a perceived increase in the risk of incidents occurring 
when using subcontractors.  
One respondent emphasised that while there was a perceived increased risk of incidents effective 
management was key: “On site management of subcontractors is key to minimising HSE incidents, 
subcontractors are more focused on productivity than quality and safety”. 
7.3. Effect on project performance 
Respondents were asked to judge the extent to which financial and non-cost project performance 
respectively were affected by the categorical variables introduced in section 4.2 (Page 23) using a 
Likert scale. A graphical summary of the responses is presented in Figure 30 (Page 59). 
The majority of respondents considered all factors to have some level of impact on both financial 
and non-cost performance. Respondents ranked the location of a project within Christchurch to 
have the lowest effect of the variables. The time of a projects start was ranked most influential on 
KRA performance, and the delivery team most influential on financial performance. Subcontractor 
engagement was considered by respondents to be influential on both financial and no-cost 
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Table 26: Motivations to engage subcontractors: A summary of responses to Likert scale questionnaire. 
 Level of Agreement 
Mean rating Overall Rank Statement Strongly Agree (1) Agree (2) 
Neutral 




Lack of internal resources (Staff or plant availability) 7 17 4 0 0 1.9 1 
Subcontractors have a required specialist trade skill / item of plant 7 18 2 1 0 1.9 1 
Lack of internal expertise/ability  4 16 6 2 0 2.2 3 
Provides flexibility to meet changing labour demands 5 18 0 4 1 2.2 3 
Engaging a subcontractor reduces financial risk  4 12 9 2 1 2.4 5 
Internal delivery presents unwanted financial risk 4 13 6 4 1 2.5 6 
Subcontracting is less costly than delivering internally 2 11 10 5 0 2.6 7 
Subcontractors perform work faster 3 8 12 4 1 2.7 8 
Subcontractors easier to manage than internal resource 2 9 13 3 1 2.7 8 
Provides cost certainty of task subcontracted 0 13 10 5 0 2.7 8 
Internal delivery is more expensive  0 5 13 10 0 3.2 11 
Table 27: Effects of engaging subcontractors over internal resources: A summary of responses to Likert scale questionnaire. 
Statement 












Quality of work delivered by subcontractors is: 
Likely to be better 0 8 13 7 0 3.0 6 
Likely to be worse 3 7 10 7 1 2.9 5 
The costs of tasks subcontracted is: 
Likely to be Certain 3 15 5 5 0 2.4 2 
Likely to be Uncertain 0 4 7 14 3 3.6 7 
When using subcontractors management costs:  
Increase 0 2 10 13 3 3.6 8 
Decrease 6 16 5 0 1 2.1 1 
When using subcontractors, non-cost performance is:  
Worse 0 1 12 12 3 3.6 8 
Better 0 10 13 5 0 2.8 4 
When using subcontractors, the risk of health safety 
or environmental incidents :  
Decrease 0 0 6 14 8 4.1 10 









Figure 28: Motivations to engage subcontractors: A summary of responses to Likert scale questionnaire. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Internal delivery is more expensive
Subcontractors perform work faster
Subcontractors easier to manage than internal resource
Subcontracting is less costly than delivering internally
Provides cost certainty of task subcontracted
Engaging a subcontractor reduces financial risk
Internal delivery presents unwanted financial risk
Lack of internal expertise/ability
Provides flexibility to meet changing labour demands
Lack of internal resources (Staff or plant availability)
Subcontractors have a required specialist trade skill / item of plant
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Figure 29: Effects of engaging subcontractors over internal resources: A summary of responses to Likert scale questionnaire. 
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Non-cost performance is better
Management costs increase
The costs of tasks are less certain
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Management costs decrease
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Figure 30: Factors effecting overall Project performance in SCIRT: A summary of responses to Likert-type scale questionnaire. 
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8. DISCUSSION  
In this section the results of the study are discussed in the context of the original research 
objectives and questions. The motivation to engage subcontractors is examined with respect to 
the three key areas of ability, flexibility, and cost. Then a review of the subcontracting strategies 
observed in the SCIRT alliance is completed, and the effects of these chosen strategies of financial 
performance non-cost performance measures are discussed. 
8.1. Motivations of principal contractors to subcontract work sections within SCIRT 
A review of the literature (section 2.2, page 6) suggested the reasoning for a reliance on 
subcontractors in the general construction industry is based on three key points: Ability, Flexibility 
and Cost. This reasoning posits that subcontractors either; possess specialist trade skills or 
equipment; Provide flexible capacity to meet the changing labour demands; and/or perform 
distinct tasks at a cheaper rate- providing overall cost certainty. This study therefore, sought to 
confirm the importance of these factors.  
8.1.1. Ability  
Principal contractors (delivery teams) within SCIRT were found to engage subcontractors primarily 
to meet project resourcing requirements that were unable to be met internally. The requirement 
for a specialist item of plant or specialist skill was the highest ranked motivating factor for 
engaging a subcontractor. This aligns directly with the ‘ability’ factor presented in the general 
construction industry.  
 
In the context of SCIRT an example of such a specialist task is pipe lining - a trenchless pipe 
rehabilitation technology which remediates broken or cracked sewer pipes to strengthen and 
mitigate groundwater penetration and root intrusion. This a specialist task that involves unique 
equipment and experienced staff. Prior to the earthquakes there was very little demand for this 
technology in Christchurch and majority of top tier civil contractors did not have internal capability 
in this area. In the aftermath of the earthquakes, demand for pipe lining increased as it was a cost 
effective solution. As a result, it was scheduled as part of many SCIRT projects. Demand for pipe 
lining subcontractors increased dramatically and all delivery teams engaged subcontractors to 
carry out this task.  In this example, the subcontractor was engaged to provide a service that could 
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8.1.2. Flexibility 
The second highest ranked motivating factor to engage subcontractors was their ability to resolve 
short term shortages in labour. The volume of work in the SCIRT programme required a large 
increase in local labour force. A short term increase in labour demand was viewed as a risk to the 
longevity of a large contractor, increasing capacity to meet the demand may result in excess staff 
at the end of the project.  Although delivery team staff numbers did increase to fulfil the Alliance 
contract, much of the labour demand was met by subcontractors.  Many small to medium 
subcontractors with bases outside the Canterbury region established themselves in Canterbury 
post-earthquake to capitalise on this demand and increased work volume. As demand dropped 
from its peak many of those subcontractors have now left the region (Wilkinson & Yan Chang-
Richards, 2016).   
 
Whilst the delivery teams all had some presence in Christchurch, some had more local resources 
and staff than others. In particular, Fulton Hogan, Downer and City Care were established civil 
maintenance contractors who held contracts with local and central government authorities in the 
region at the time of the earthquakes. Fletcher Construction and McConnell Dowell had interests 
in the Canterbury construction market but lacked the same extent of labour and resource as the 
other delivery teams. Those delivery teams with a less accessible local resource relied more 
heavily on subcontractors to resource their work as a result.   
8.1.3. Cost 
Project Managers in SCIRT engaged subcontractors where they were able to perform at or below 
the rates allowed for in the project TOC. The risk of cost overrun and poor productivity, was a 
motivating factor to engage a subcontractor. Over 60% of managers questioned agreed that 
internal delivery presented a financial risk. These managers view subcontracting with fixed rates 
as a way to gain cost certainty rather than an opportunity to complete work at a cheaper rate than 
what is attainable with internal resources.   
Improved project financial or non-cost performance was not ranked highly as a motivating factor 
by delivery teams. Less than half of those delivery team employees questioned agreed that a 
subcontractor’s ability to perform the work cheaper than internal resources was a motivating 
factor toward engaging with them.  Many managers commented that in SCIRT cost was not as 
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stretching available internal resources, subcontractors were engaged to meet the resource 
shortage at any acceptable cost, generally without extensive bid-shopping.   
 
8.2. Subcontracting Strategies Observed in the SCIRT alliance 
During SCIRT, all delivery teams did not utilise subcontractors to the same extent.  Between the 
five delivery teams there appears to be three different strategies employed – 1) external delivery 
strategy, 2) balanced delivery strategy and 3) internal delivery strategy (Table 28). 












Subcontract as much as possible all 
physical works. Retain Internal technical 





Utilise internal resources in existing core 
business areas. Utilise subcontractors 





Self-perform where at all possible. 
Recruit skills if necessary. Use 
subcontractors for only specialised tasks. 
40%-30% E 35% 
 
Two delivery teams (A & C) utilised an external delivery strategy – where subcontractors were 
engaged to deliver the vast majority of physical works.  In this strategy, the delivery team retains 
only the key project management and supervisory functions to coordinate and monitor the 
progress of physical works. Subcontractors are utilised where at all possible and engaged through 
a variety of contractual mechanisms, tendered measure and value rates,   
 
Two delivery teams (B & D) utilised a balanced delivery strategy. In this strategy existing internal 
resources are used to perform work that is within the delivery team’s core area of business, and 
subcontractors are used to deliver outside their expertise or to meet internal resource shortages.  
 
One Delivery team (E) utilised an internal delivery strategy, where at all possible physical works 
were performed internally. Skilled staff are recruited and necessary plant are procured to make 
delivery feasible. Subcontractors were engaged for specialist tasks when the use of internal 




8. Discussion  
 
8.2.1. Minimum requirement  
During the course of the Alliance delivery teams were able to choose how the work allocated to 
them was delivered - with the exception of one requirement: A minimum of 40% of the work 
completed, by cost, must be subcontracted (Christchurch Infrastructure Alliance , 2011). This 
requirement was included as part of the Alliance agreement to foster a competitive local 
construction market and encourage local business development.  
 
Only one delivery team utilised subcontractors at the specified minimum requirement. All other 
teams chose to utilise subcontractors significantly more than the minimum.  It is possible to 
conclude then, assuming all delivery teams acted in self-interest to maximise the margin available, 
the chosen delivery strategy was either not perceived to affect margin or delivery teams had 
unique internal drivers for the strategy employed.  
 
8.2.2. Motivation to use different subcontracting  strategies 
It is curious that in an Alliance environment, where communications and learnings were readily 
shared between delivery teams, that subcontracting strategy differed so significantly, and that 
one optimum strategy was not arrived upon.  The aggregated commentary received during this 
research indicates there are multiple factors that may explain this observed difference in 
subcontracting strategy between delivery teams.  
 
Above all, the extent of locally available internal resources is the critical factor in the decision to 
engage a subcontractor. A firm with large local internal resource base is required by its situation 
to utilise these internal staff - or carry their cost burden. Before engaging a subcontractor, all 
available internal staff must be fully utilised.  Conversely, as discussed in section 8.1.2 (page 61) 
those delivery teams with a less accessible local resource relied more heavily on subcontractors 
to resource their work as a result. Principal contractors with an existing large local labour base will 
inevitably tend toward an internal delivery strategy. Unless the scope of work is outside the skill 
set of the existing labour base – in which case a suitable subcontractor would be sought and 





8. Discussion  
Commentary from managers indicates there may also be different opinions on risk management 
approaches between delivery teams. Multiple managers from delivery teams utilising balanced 
strategies commented that the utilisation of internal resources allows the project manager to 
capitalise on risks and derive a financial benefit through effective project management. Whereas 
subcontract rates for similar tasks will generally include an allowance for risk, and the principal 
will incur this cost regardless of whether or not the risks eventuates. Principal contractors looking 
to derive a financial benefit from proactive risk management will likely tend toward an internal 
delivery strategy, however this requires skilled project management.     
 
Multiple managers commented that the limb payment system incentivised the use of internal 
plant, this presents a further factor that may explain the differing choice of delivery strategy. 
Managers commented that delivery teams were effectively able to guarantee adequate plant 
hours to warrant the procurement of plant items. Although the agreed plant cost rates within 
SCIRT were audited regularly and aligned with industry standard, an opportunity may have existed 
for delivery teams to facilitate optimum cost recovery on plant and derive a financial return 
through the provision of plant at an actual cost lower than the agreed rate. This derived return, 
may have offset any cost overrun or ‘pain’ experienced in the even that TOC was exceeded. It was 
hypothesised by SCIRT staff that this situation incentivised internal delivery and enabled the 
expansion of existing internal resource.  Investigation of this scenario was outside the scope of 
this research – but would be necessary to completely understand the motivation to deliver with 
internal resource.  
 
8.3. Correlation between subcontractor engagement and financial performance 
Within the New Zealand civil contracting industry, there is a commonly held opinion that the 
utilisation of subcontractor rates in competitively tendered work renders a tender less 
competitive. There is a perception that the profit margin allowed within the subcontractors 
pricing, and the profit margin allowed by the principal, will compound to result in an un-
competitive price. If this notion were to be founded, then one may expect to observe in SCIRT an 
increased ultimate cost of delivery as subcontractor utilisation increases. However, this study has 
been unable to observe any such significant trend. On the contrary, the study indicates the 
opposite trend. In the sample data analysed, increased subcontractor usage correlates with better 
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The positive correlation between subcontract use and financial performance is weak and has low 
statistical significance. However, observing a more statistically significant result may be 
particularly difficult due to the limitation of having only five observable delivery teams.  Significant 
differences in the extent of subcontractor use were found across; value, scope and location sub-
categories. However, in none of these categories was a significant difference in financial 
performance observed. As the SCIRT programme progressed an improvement in financial 
performance was observed as the SCIRT programme 
 
Dissemination of the commentary provided by delivery team personnel who had influence over 
the management of, or decision to use (or not to use), subcontractors within SCIRT posits three 
possible rationalisations that may explain this result: 
8.3.1. Cost certainty through subcontract procurement 
Where at all possible, delivery teams do not engage subcontractors at rates that exceed the 
productivity and cost assumptions used to formulate the TOC estimate. Subcontractors are 
engaged through measure and value or lump-sum procurement arrangements where cost 
certainty for the principal is attained. This is in contrast to the cost reimbursable basis of payment 
utilised for delivery teams – where productivity risks remain with the delivery team.  
8.3.2. Separation of responsibility for productivity 
In an internal delivery strategy, responsibility for meeting required productivity targets rest with 
the project management and supervision personnel. These same personnel are also, in this 
scenario, responsible for many other considerations, for example; safety management, project 
staff line management, and quality management. The procurement of subcontractors to perform 
the physical works, clearly separates project management staff from productivity concern and 
allows more focus on other these other considerations. Utilising an internal delivery strategy – 
productivity may come at the expense of increased safety and quality concerns.  
8.3.3. Financial motivation cascade 
Where comparatively small subcontract firms are used, it is common for majority shareholders in 
the firm to be heavily involved in the physical works. Subcontract firm owners in SCIRT were 
observed in site supervision and management capacity, or in many cases providing direct site 
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individual project may have a large impact on the firms overall profitability and a majority 
shareholder managing the work is likely to be directly motivated to ensure these targets are met. 
 
8.4. Subcontract procurement for productivity  
The limb payment mechanisms (Section 2.6.4, page 12) utilised in SCIRT may have affected a 
delivery team’s decisions to engage subcontractors over using internal resources. Internal costs 
were charged independently of construction progress, through the cost reimbursable contract 
format. Conversely, in many cases subcontracts could be procured with a measure and value 
contract facility - meaning subcontractors could be paid by work completed, rather than by the 
time taken / actual costs incurred. This procurement methodology can effectively transfer the 
productivity risk from the principal to the subcontractor by creating a direct financial incentive for 
improved performance.  
 
As discussed in section 2.4 (pg. 7), one core driver behind the use of relational and alliance style 
contracts is to remove uncertainty and risk from the client-contractor relationship, and to enable 
both parties to share any benefits (or losses) that this collaboration may result in.  It is significant 
then, that when given opportunity to do so, many contractors rely on a traditional-style 
subcontracts to deliver work. As a result, the uncertainty (which the original procurement model 
sought to avoid) is transferred to the non-alliance participants. It is reasonable then, to 
hypothesise that procurement style may have a causal effect on financial performance. 
 
If so, there is potential that the positive relationship between subcontracting and financial 
performance indicated by this study may be due to financial efficiency gained by employing 
traditional (non-relational) contracts. 
 
As with SCIRT, overall uncertainty of project scope and need to deliver rapidly are further drivers 
to use relational forms of contract in disaster response works. The time and cost needed to 
adequately prepare a formal contract between public clients and principal construction 
contractors is often undesirable.  However, as shown in SCIRT, principal contractors are clearly 
able to form formal subcontracts with acceptable costs and time resources.  Perhaps, without the 
need to adhere to public procurement and transparency regulations, principals can divide the 
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8.5. Correlation between subcontractor engagement and non-cost performance 
A negative relationship between subcontractor engagement and non-cost performance was 
observed in the sample data analysed. Non-cost performance was measured as the monthly KRA 
score, of which Quality, Safety and Environmental performance are key inputs. The negative 
correlation of subcontractor engagement and non-cost performance result is generally expected 
among project management professionals. 
 
A common theme in project management literature discusses the interplay between the triple 
constraints of cost, quality and time in any given project (Project Management Institute, 2013). 
The theory posits that it is not possible to optimise all three constraints, and that the optimisation 
of two of these constraints will negatively impact the third. In the context of this research, utilising 
subcontractors can effectively control cost and productivity (time) constraints, if procured 
correctly. Then, it could be expected by way of the triple constraint theory - that quality 
considerations would be negatively affected as subcontractor engagement increases.  
 
The observed negative relationship between quality and subcontractor engagement was also 
expected, to some degree, by delivery team personnel questioned for this research. In comparison 
to internal delivery, respondents ranked an increase in health and safety incidents when using 
subcontractors the third highest effect behind a decrease in management and increased cost 
certainty. Also, delivery teams that employed a balanced or internal delivery strategy considered 
that quality was likely to be negatively affected by the extent of subcontractor engagement.  
 
An external delivery strategy aims to utilise subcontract procurement functions to control time 
and cost constraints and focus internal resource on the monitoring and controlling quality (KRA) 
and scope. In the context of the SCIRT Alliance the quality constraint encompasses all KRA 
performance areas. An internal strategy must therefore employ a more rigorous project 
management plan as internal resources will be expected to balance time, cost and quality without 
the aid of a subcontract procurement facility.    
 
8.6. Internal subcontractors and relational subcontracts 
Some project managers commented on the use of ‘internal subcontractors’ in delivering SCIRT 
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project managers are able to draw on specific internal resources to deliver work. For example; the 
internal road surfacing department may supply asphalt surfacing for a roading project – but have 
no other interaction with the other construction tasks in project. In effect, the department is 
treated the same as a subcontractor. However, there are key differences between utilising internal 
and external subcontractors, critically the three rationalisation for improved financial 
performance discussed in section 8.3 (pg. 64) do not apply to internal subcontractors; 
 
1) Cost certainty through procurement; in an alliance environment where actual costs are 
charged directly to the project, without a formal contract to separate financial responsibility, 
cost certainty is unable to be achieved.  
2) Separation of responsibility for productivity; As there is no formal subcontract to remove the 
financial risk for the task from the project management team the act of engaging an ‘internal 
subcontractor’ does not remove the requirement to actively manage construction 
productivity.  
3) Financial motivation cascade; In an internal subcontracting scenario both the internal 
department and the project management team experience the same level of personal 
financial incentive to increase performance, where typically no persons involved in the project 
delivery are significant shareholders in the delivery firm. 
 
In order to provide effective insulation from cost and productivity concerns, the Principal- 
Subcontractor relationship must take the form of a traditional contract. In situations where a 
relational/alliance contract exists between the Principal and the Client, a similar relational 
contract form for a subcontract is typically unable to provide effective separation from cost and 
productivity concerns. As exemplified in the case of an internal subcontractor, direct responsibility 
for cost, and consequence for cost overrun is required to rationalise a positive correlation 
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This chapter presents conclusions of this study, and describes the contribution made to the 
existing body of knowledge on subcontractor use in civil construction. Recommendations for 
further research in this area are also presented.   
9.1. Conclusions 
Motivations for the use of subcontractors in the delivery of the SCIRT Alliance contract are based 
on three factors: Ability, Flexibility and Cost. Principal contractors engage with subcontractors 
because they; possess specialist trade skills or equipment; Provide flexible capacity to meet the 
changing labour demands; and/or perform distinct tasks at a cheaper rate- providing overall cost 
certainty.  
In SCIRT there are clear differences in the extent to which subcontractors were utilised by principal 
contractors. Presented with similar project scope in the same contractual environment, principal 
contractors independently chose to utilise subcontractors to different extents. The subcontracting 
strategies observed in SCIRT can be presented in three broad categories; 
1) Internal Delivery – work is performed predominantly by internal resources. 
2) Balanced Delivery – work is performed by subcontractors where internal resource is unable. 
3) External Delivery – the majority of work is performed by subcontractors.  
  
Analysis in this study suggests that a positive correlation exists between subcontractor 
engagement and overall financial performance. Principal contractors that utilised an external 
delivery strategy exhibited better financial performance than the other principal contractors. This 
trend may be explained by the ability for a subcontract to; provide cost certainty, separate 
productivity from other conflicting priorities, and cascade financial performance incentives closer 
to the physical work being performed. 
 
A negative correlation was observed between subcontractor engagement and non-financial 
performance. Increased subcontractor engagement was correlated with reduced performance in 
quality, safety, environmental and other non-cost key result areas. This can be explained by the 
triple constrain theorem whereby the optimisation of productivity (time and cost constraints) 
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9.2. Contribution to knowledge  
The theoretical benefits of engaging subcontractors in general construction are well documented, 
however the actual experience and effect of subcontractor use in the civil construction industry is 
largely absent from literature.  This work has used an analytical, data driven approach to observe 
correlations between subcontractor engagement and performance that, for the most part, 
support the theoretical benefits and drawbacks of using subcontracts presented in literature.  
 
This work serves to provide business leaders within the New Zealand civil construction industry 
empirical evidence of the effects of subcontractor engagement in a relational contracting 
environment. With this knowledge, it is hoped that more informed opinions about the relative 
merits and drawbacks of subcontractor engagement are held within the industry. 
 
9.3. Recommendations for future research 
A link may exist between financial efficiency and the form of subcontracts used within a relational 
contract environment. This theory posits that in order to provide the necessary insulation from 
cost and productivity concerns, the Principal-Subcontractor relationship must take the form of a 
traditional contract. The contrast between a relational style head contract and traditional form of 
subcontract may derive an opportunity for improved financial performance.   
Investigations should be made into situations where subcontractors are engaged on the same 
contractual terms as the principal contract.  Where there is no observable improvement in 
performance with subcontractor engagement in this scenario, it may indicate that any efficiency 
gains are due to traditional contract forms.  
 
Further to this, an investigation of the payment system used in SCIRT to ascertain whether the 
system incentivised the use of internal plant.  The results of such an investigation could be used 
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 Regression Tables 
Table 29: Linear regression using total expenditure on subcontractors to predict overall sample performance against 
TOC.   
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
.738 .545 .393 .069 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .017 1 .017 3.588 .155b 
Residual .014 3 .005   
Total .032 4    
a. Dependent Variable: % Spent of TOC Sum 







t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.320 .164  8.028 .004 
% Total Spend on 
Subcontractors -.492 .260 -.738 -1.894 .155 
a. Dependent Variable: % Spent of TOC Sum 
 
Table 30: Regression model to predict Relative Non-cost Performance using the proportion of subcontracted hours 
worked each month and delivery team. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1640.606a 5 328.121 49.245 .000 
Intercept 168.842 1 168.842 25.340 .000 
Delivery Team * Sub % 1620.109 4 405.027 60.788 .000 
Sub % 213.767 1 213.767 32.083 .000 
Error 1092.731 164 6.663   
Total 2733.337 170    
Corrected Total 2733.337 169    
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